This weekend Ulster Bank published the results of the review into practices at its Global Restructuring Group (GRG) in the Republic of Ireland (GRG) yesterday, 19th Dec 2014. The probe by law firm Mason, Hayes and Curran was commissioned in response to the Tomlinson Report, by UK businessman Lawrence Tomlinson. This firm provides legal & debt recovery services to UB., and its role in this undertaking is questionable & unconvincing. Lawrence Tomlinson was the UK Conservative Government’s Entrepreneur-in-residence (2013 – 2014). The Tomlinson Report [Banks Lending Practices: Treatment of Businesses in distress’ (2013)] had accused Royal Bank of Scotland’s (RBS) GRG unit of systematically charging small and medium enterprises large fees and ultimately (in several cases) of putting them out of business, at the expense of generating quick profit. Such quick profits were utilised to patch-up the respective troubled Banks’ balance sheets. However last month the UK Parliamentary Committee on Banking Standards publicly chastised Ulster Bank’s parent RBS., for the admittance that two senior executives quite deliberately misinformed the Committee earlier this year that it didn’t operated its Global Recovery as a Profit Centre. At the time of the Bank’s previous denial, it, instead maintained that it’s prime objective in setting up this division in 2008 (operated in parallel with its Parent Bank’s GRG) was euphemistically described by UB itself as setting out to “Restore , Refresh and Rejuvenate”. This alliterative-speak echoes the Walmart-esque sloganism of UB and RBS under the entirely discredited stewardship of Fred Goodwin . “What does securitisation do?It takes the profits that you get from holding a loan over a period and pulls a big chunk of these profits into today’s P & L,. therefore contributing to bonuses” extracted from ‘Shredded, Inside RBS, by Ian Fraser (2014) Ulster Bank is still likely to find itself in-the-dock with respect to activities akin to engaging in Profit Centre-focused activities which severely hampered & ultimately destroyed the businesses of many of its good Clients. Such activities are examples of carry-overs from (A) Breaches of approved Banking Practices in the areas of the proper usage of FactFinds in inappropriately selling Investment Products, and in some cases ‘selling’ additional loans on the back of these disastrous investments in commercial properties (Canary Wharf inter alia), and (B) Interest Rate Swap/ Hedging Agreements’ mis-selling – where no tolerance-testing on Borrowers’ repayment capacity was scrutinised prior to enforcing excessive lending rates. Ulster Bank’ whitewashing efforts would have been better used if applied to country cottages in Conamara.